March 15, 2016 10:07 AM
More than a year before the Chairman's "unlock the box
" initiative, the Chairman had a different idea
: if the FCC made it easier to become an over-the-top ("OTT") multi-channel video programming distributor ("MVPD"), then more companies would enter the market, and this competition would benefit all subscription video consumers. You might think this would appeal to a new entrant with TV ambitions, like Google.
After all, the subscription TV market is devilishly hard to penetrate even if you can get the capital to build a distribution system. A year ago, Google had 20,000 customers
in Kansas City--after 5 years of trying. But, Google wasn't in love with the Chairman's idea. Why not?The Market Is Internet Advertising . . . on TV Screens
Google is the dominant company in Internet advertising because it sells information about you
--that it learns from your use of its applications, and devices--to advertisers. If you're using the Internet, whether on a computer, mobile phone, or tablet, then there's a 70-85% likelihood that you're looking at Google ads (according this WSJ article
re: the FTC Bureau of Competition 2012 staff recommendation on Google's abuse of its market power in online advertising).
When you watch TV, however, the ads you see are not targeted at you personally, because they haven't been placed by Google. This is something Google has been trying to fix
since shortly after it first announced
plans to build a fiber network. Google, through its Google TV
, and then Android TV
makes "smart TVs" (with Google software built into the TV) and "buddy boxes" (set top boxes that work with a cable box/cable remote) available to consumers. But none of these efforts have been particularly successful--leading industry observers to conclude that Google needed "another path to the TV screen
Then, a year ago, Google decided to try an "experiment
" in Kansas City in which it combined its TV customers' content, and viewing history, with its advertising algorithms in order to sell targeted ads on the customers' TV screens. Most likely, Google discovered that the content itself was the secret ingredient
that would allow it to integrate the TV screen into its advertising universe.
So why not become an OTT MVPD in the proceeding
that Chairman Wheeler had initiated in December of 2014? One obvious problem with this strategy is that MVPDs have long been subject to extremely strict FCC rules
about disclosing customers' personally-identifiable information--rules that don't apply to edge providers like Google. The other problem with this approach is that the subscription TV market is devilishly hard to penetrate
--just to get access to the customer's video content. Thus, shortly after Google announced its Kansas City TV experiment, it (along with several of its Google TV partners, trade associations, and pressure groups) formed the Consumer Video Choice Coalition
("CVCC") and began lobbying the Commission on a new set of issues.The FCC Unbundles Video to Create "Device Market" Competition?
On February 18th, after 6 months of intensive lobbying by the CVCC, the FCC voted to require multichannel video programming distributors (hereinafter "MVPDs") to, effectively, "unbundle" the video stream going to and from the customer's television. See, "Set Top Box NPRM
". The Commission explains that its proposed rules requiring video stream unbundling are necessary "because MVPDs offer products that directly compete with navigation devices and therefore have an incentive to withhold permission or constrain innovation, which would frustrate Section 629's goal of assuring a commercial market for navigation devices." Set Top Box NPRM
at para 12.
The FCC seems to believe that if it can imply that the MVPDs were responsible for the failure of the Commission's CableCARD rules, and that the MVPDs would likely frustrate any future rules to facilitate device interoperability, then it will be justified in implementing full-scale video stream unbundling. So, on the thinnest of grounds--a couple of anecdotes, and a facially absurd theory--the FCC asserts that that MVPDs "offered poor support" for the CableCARD rules, and have the ability and incentive to frustrate the manufacture/sale of navigation devices by third parties. Set Top Box NPRM
at paras 7, 12, and 28. The actual answer to the Commission's question was already available--but it wasn't the right answer.
The Commission's theory regarding MVPD's "incentive and ability" to foreclose third party sales of navigation devices has been litigated through trial in two separate consumer class action antitrust cases, and this theory has never been found to be supported by any evidence
. See, Jarrett v. Insight Communications Co.
, (W.D. Ky. July 14, 2014)
and Healy v. Cox Enterprises
(W.D. Ok. Dec. 15, 2015). If you bother to read either of these cases, you may also be surprised to learn that the device manufacturing market is very competitive
--with at least 5 major vendors competing for each cable system.
So, as was the case with the Commission's reclassification
of broadband Internet access, a very small number of privileged entities (Google, its partners and pressure groups) benefit from rules designed to address conduct that is not even hypothetically rational
--much less, likely. Still, you might think, who cares if the TV providers now have to compete with Google to sell ads to viewers? But, Google won't be competing with your TV provider.Don't Expect Much New Competition in the Device, or Online Advertising, Markets
One of the issues from the Commission's Net Neutrality Order
(currently on appeal) is whether the FCC could, as part of reclassifying broadband Internet access as a "telecommunications service," classify all of an Internet user's formerly non-confidential information (the kind Google sells to advertisers) as "Customer Proprietary Network Information" ("CPNI") under Section 222 of the Act
. The statutory definition of CPNI is fairly broad, and includes information "made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship." 47 USC 222(f)(1)
If the DC Circuit agrees with the FCC that previously non-confidential customer data is now CPNI, as the result of the Commission's change in service definitions, then the FCC could limit the ability of ISPs to provide customer usage information to advertisers. This was exactly the position that was being urged
on the Commission by the Eric Schmidt/Google-funded
pressure group New America
, only a week before Chairman Wheeler put his "unlock the box" editorial
Last Wednesday, in a Senate Judiciary Committee Oversight Hearing
, FTC chair, Edith Ramirez, was grilled on why the FTC overrode the recommendations
of its Bureau of Competition and closed an investigation into Google's abuse of its market dominance in the online advertising market. Not un-ironically, two days later, the FCC released a "fact sheet
," describing its proposed rules to prevent ISPs from competing in that market by providing the same kind of ads that Google does
--over your computer, mobile, and now, TV screens.
December 23, 2015 5:25 PM
Two weeks ago, AT&T announced
plans to bring its "GigaPower," very high-speed (300Mbps and up), broadband Internet service to 38 new markets in 2016--on top of the 18 markets that AT&T already has up-and-running on the service. A day later, Google Fiber announced on the company's blog
that it was exploring expanding its service (available in 3 cities/markets, but under construction in 6 more) to Chicago and Los Angeles. Both announcements were widely reported by the news media, which has favored a "fiber race" narrative
ever since both AT&T
announced--on the same day--their respective plans to deliver gigabit speed Internet service to Austin, TX.
Thus, analyst Jeff Kagan compares
the strides of "the two heavy hitters in ultra-fast, ultra high speed, gigabit Internet services." In the Washington Post
, reporter Brian Fung observes
that, "AT&T is benefiting tremendously from a chain reaction that Google initially began," though he concludes that, "Google's early lead in the fiber race [is] being eaten away by AT&T's traditional advantage in building networks."
But, while the "fiber race" narrative may add an element of human drama to the otherwise impersonal dynamic of broadband competition, Google's fiber-to-the-premise ("FTTP") network is not the first that AT&T would be compared with in the media. It is, however, the first time the media has favorably
compared AT&T to a FTTP-based service provider--and this is the more interesting aspect of the story. AT&T Starts the "Fiber Race"
As AT&T's service name--"U-Verse® with GigaPowerSM"--suggests, AT&T started building its gigabit speed network long before Google Fiber. In 2004, AT&T observed that, by using a fiber to the node ("FTTN") architecture (which deploys fiber to the last traffic aggregation point prior to distribution to the customer's premise (the "node")), it could quickly provide better-than-DSL speeds (i.e
., 6Mbps vs. 3Mbps) to the maximum number of customers, and position AT&T to be able to progressively replace copper with fiber as bandwidth demand moved from the network core to the edge (residential consumers). In 2005, AT&T decided it would call its IP network "U-Verse
" and service was launched in 2006. See this
2006 timeline/summary from AT&T.
To illustrate how FTTN is designed to evolve, consider the tremendous surge in demand for wireless data over the last 10 years. To expand capacity, AT&T has created more cell sites, and has steadily added fiber to replace the copper lines that "backhaul" traffic from the cell sites to its backbone network. This means that, in some areas, AT&T can use new fiber in order to "groom" existing U-Verse neighborhoods onto new broadband distribution nodes closer to the customer--thus reducing the copper loop length, and enabling faster DSL transmission speeds. It's No FiOS
In 2005, Verizon began deploying its FTTP network, FiOS
, and--although Verizon's FTTP would take longer to deploy (to reach a similar percentage of customers) the network itself was/is considered the gold standard. Thus, among "experts," in the media, and, by self-described "wonks," its early years, AT&T's U-Verse network was always being compared--unfavorably--to FiOS. U-Verse was the "Jan Brady" of broadband.
An industry newsletter, from 2007, reports
that (at the FTTH (Fiber to the Home) Council meeting in late 2006), "AT&T, with its FTTN deployment, showed that it was thinking along the same lines as Verizon
. . . [b]ut many in the audience were skeptical about whether AT&T could even deliver HDTV with its fiber-plus-VDSL plant
." (emphasis added) A year later, when AT&T increased its broadband Internet speed from 6Mbps to 10Mbps, one tech news site reported
, "AT&T Bumps U-Verse Top Speed to 10Mbps, Verizon Chuckles." Months later, at the end of 2008, AT&T almost doubled its top speed --to 18Mbps . . . and was still
As recently as 4 years ago, Susan Crawford--who framed the President's views on telecommunications policy--had already counted AT&T out of the "broadband" market. In an essay
in the New York Times
, Crawford argued for the regressive application of Title II regulations for broadband services (which the FCC adopted this year) on the basis that cable was a monopoly, unlikely to be challenged by U-Verse, which "cannot provide comparable speeds because, while it uses fiber optic cable to reach neighborhoods, the signal switches to slower copper lines to connect to houses." Perceptions Are Not Reality
Fortunately, for AT&T, its consumers (the people that pay for the network) disagreed with the critics. In fact, almost a year before Prof. Crawford had discounted U-Verse as a competitor to cable, consumers were telling Consumer Reports
that U-Verse was among the best choices (with, of course, FiOS) for bundled broadband, TV, and phone service. Only a month after Crawford's essay, AT&T verified the Consumer Reports survey, reporting
that consumer U-Verse revenues increased by an impressive 44% in 2011.
By the end of 2013, despite the early skepticism about "whether AT&T could even deliver HDTV with its fiber-plus-VDSL plant," AT&T's U-Verse passed
Verizon's FiOS in numbers of video customers served. AT&T's network and top Internet speeds have consistently improved every year, with its top U-Verse speed increasing
to 75Mbps a year ago. Not surprisingly, consumer adoption of U-Verse broadband Internet service has also steadily improved--growing at 30% annually over the last 5 years.
Finally, while the eye of the media has been on FTTP deployments like Google
Fiber, it's what has been happening in copper that has almost-certainly
put AT&T in position to provide super-fast Internet access more
quickly--and in more places--than any other ISP. Over the last 6 years,
in DSL technology have allowed for faster transmission speeds--very close to those supported by fiber--over legacy facilities.Overnight Success
Having been "counted out"--or never counted "in"--by the media has some advantages. One of these benefits is all the positive publicity AT&T is now getting from publications that may have never expected something they associate with an "innovative" "edge" company--like super-fast broadband--to be done better by a "monopoly" "ISP."
But, it's difficult to overcome perceptions--particularly when these perceptions have been fed by the FCC. The Washington Post article
, cited above, looks for an explanation for how AT&T was able to overcome "Google's early lead in the fiber race." Given the perception of Google's early lead, it would be hard for AT&T to convince anyone that it started the race before Google. Instead, the article quotes AT&T's Jim Cicconi as saying, "[w]e're pretty good at this, and we've had a lot of years to get good at it." That's as good an explanation as any.
October 26, 2015 3:08 PM
On October 16th, the FCC issued an Order Initiating Investigation and Designating Issues for Investigation ("Investigations Order
") concerning the provision of point-to-point data transmission services ("special access") by the country's largest incumbent LECs (AT&T, CenturyLink, Frontier, and Verizon). These services, when provided by ILECs, are still subject to FCC price regulation. Although the FCC has "de-tariffed" many of these services, much like the recently re-classified
"Broadband Internet Access" service, ILEC special access services remain subject to Section 201's requirement that they be "just and reasonable." The Commission's Non-Price "Concern"
Superficially, the FCC's investigation is about the ancillary effects of the volume and term commitments that some CLECs have agreed to in order to receive the ILECs' lowest prices on special access services. However, the Commission's overview and explanation of its concerns suggest that its inquiry is much broader than the competitive concerns with discount contracts that have been identified in the case law, and associated economics literature, the Commission briefly discusses. See, Investigations Order
at n. 54.
The Commission's only potentially
-legitimate non-price concern is succinctly stated only once in the entire first 12 pages of the Investigations Order. The FCC quotes a CLEC ex parte letter arguing that the term and volume commitments in the ILEC tariffs "shrink[ ] the addressable market for competitive wholesale special access providers (thereby preventing them from achieving minimum viable scale), and cause[ ] special access prices to remain higher than would otherwise be the case." Investigations Order
, Paragraph 12 [internal citation omitted].
Everything else the Commission identifies as a question, or unresolved contention between the ILECs and CLECs, is more properly classified as "something that the CLECs don't like having to do in order to get the lowest possible prices." The CLECs' gripes are certainly reasonable (from their perspective), but they are not competition-affecting issues; they are bargaining issues.When Good Discounts Go Bad
One issue (out of many the FCC identifies) is that conduct that is otherwise competitively benign "may be impermissibly exclusionary when practiced by a monopolist." See, U.S. v. Dentsply
, 399 F.3d 181
, 187 (3d Cir. 2005). Sometimes monopolies (firms with market shares approaching, or greater than, 80%) will use "discount contracts" as a way to limit the ability of new entrants to enter the market for the product/service being offered through the discount contracts. The FCC references some of these cases in n. 54. Let's take a closer look at a representative case in order to better understand situations in which these agreements can injure competition.
In ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp
., 696 F.3d 254
(3d Cir. 2012), the product market was heavy duty transmissions for big trucks, such as 18 wheelers, cement mixers, and garbage trucks. The defendant, Eaton, was a monopolist in the U.S. heavy duty transmissions market from the 1950s until Meritor entered in 1989. By 1999, Meritor had garnered a 17% share of the heavy duty transmissions market. In mid-1999, Meritor and a leading European heavy-duty transmissions manufacturer, ZF AG, formed a joint venture to adapt a popular ZF AG model to the U.S. market.
In the U.S. market for heavy duty transmissions, there are 4 direct purchaser customers; these firms are the original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"). Truck buyers, the ultimate consumers of heavy duty transmissions, purchase trucks from the OEMs by "assembling" components from the OEMs' catalogs. It is, therefore, vitally important for a component part manufacturer to be listed in the OEM catalog--and on reasonable terms.
From late 1999-2000, the U.S. trucking industry experienced a 40-50% decline in demand for new vehicles. Shortly thereafter, Eaton entered into new long term agreements ("LTAs") with the 4 OEMs. Long term agreements were not uncommon in this industry, but Eaton's new agreements were "unprecedented" in their length (the shortest were for a minimum of 5 years).
The new LTAs provided the OEMs with substantial up-front cash "rebates" of $1-2.5 million. In exchange, the OEMs agreed to use Eaton transmissions in a very high percentage (usually, >90%) of their vehicles sold. If an OEM missed its sales targets in any year, it was required to return in full all "advance" rebates it had received from Eaton. Finally, the agreements required OEMs to artificially increase the price of ZF Meritor transmissions by $150-200, and to impose additional "penalties" on customers that still chose ZF Meritor transmissions.
By 2003, ZF Meritor determined that it was limited to no more than 8% of the market due to the Eaton's agreements with the OEMs. ZF Meritor needed to get at least 10% of the market in order to remain viable, so it adopted a strategy of trying to sell directly to the end-user customers. Nonetheless, at the end of 2005, its market share had dropped to 4%, and, in January of 2007, ZF Meritor exited the market. Shortly thereafter, ZF Meritor sued Eaton on antitrust grounds. A jury returned a verdict in favor of ZF Meritor, which was upheld on appeal by the 3d Circuit Court of Appeals.The Commission's Investigation of Dissimilar Discounts
Every antitrust case involving discount contracts, as well as the economic literature cited by the Commission, has several facts in common with the ZF Meritor
case. First, the product or service has to be an input to the product or service the customer sells to its customers. Second, it must be the case that only 1 firm can supply the majority of any customer's demand for the input, and, that firm almost always has a market share of 80% or greater. Third, the primary "victim" of the contracts is not the purchaser, but rather the direct competitor
, of the seller.
Finally, and this last condition is implicit, but the most important for our purposes. In every instance where discount contracts have been found to harm competition, these contracts affect the entire relevant market for the product or service (or a very high majority of that market)
. If a new entrant can enter the market
(for the same service the dominant firm is supplying through its "discount contracts") without selling to the same customers, then the discount contracts can have only a speculative and de minimus effect on competition
--regardless of how "unfair" they may seem to an outside observer.Do CLECs Represent the Majority of Demand for Wholesale Data Transmission Services?
This, of course, is the first question the FCC should have addressed if it was genuinely concerned about competitive conditions in the wholesale transmission market. To understand the importance of CLEC demand to the capital deployment decisions of competitive wholesale network service providers, let's look at a competitor that successfully entered the market after the FCC started its special access inquiry
. Zayo, according to the company history on its website
was founded in 2007 in order to take advantage of the favorable Internet, data, and wireless growth trends driving the demand for bandwidth infrastructure, colocation and connectivity services.
So, if the ILECs have tied up the demand of some CLECs--which could otherwise go to competitors like Zayo, then who is buying from Zayo instead of the ILEC? Fortunately, Zayo solves this mystery in a presentation
to investors in May of this year.
What? Zayo is selling to some of these same CLECs and
those wascally ILECs? In fact, as we can see, while wireline providers--including those same special access sellers that are under investigation--do constitute the largest group of potential customers for a new entrant, they are still only a minority of total market demand. Moreover, it is hard to say how much the incremental CLEC demand would be--if not "locked down"--but it's doubtful that it would make the pie a whole lot wider. Why Does the FCC Insist on Its Ruse of an Investigation?
We've previously pointed out
that "ILEC special access" is not a relevant product market. Because "ILEC special access" is not a relevant market, it's not at all surprising that the FCC cannot point to a single, specific, direct competitor victim. Instead, the Commission seems quite willing--perhaps too willing--to simply accept the purchasers' assurances that a victim exists; just a more "theoretical" victim than the antitrust laws protect.
So, if the Commission's ostensible question for "investigation" is nothing more than the thinnest veneer to disguise price regulation, why is the FCC even bothering with the pretense of an investigation? While it doesn't make much sense to price-regulate a fraction of a "market," if that's what the FCC wants to do, then it should at least regulate prices in a transparent manner. Good government isn't always smart, but it should always be transparent to its citizens.
October 5, 2015 11:46 AM
The notion that extending regulation of ILEC special access could be bad for anyone (who's not an ILEC), much less retail business customers, may seem incongruous. After all, if the competitors--who are serving real business customers--are in favor of imposing regulations on ILEC special access, then how could it possibly hurt their customers? Competition, Contracts, and Consumer Inertia
Last September, Chairman Wheeler described
the mass market for broadband Internet access as so non-competitive that it made little difference if a customer faced a monopoly, or had a choice of service provider. The Chairman stated,
[c]ounting the number of choices the consumer has on the day before their Internet service is installed does not measure their competitive alternatives the day after. Speech
at 4. The reason, he explained, is that "[o]nce consumers choose a broadband provider, they face high switching costs [like] . . . early-termination fees. . . . Id
. Interesting observation, but is it accurate?
Well, in April of 2010, the FCC surveyed
a representative sample of broadband subscribers about their broadband purchasing/switching behavior over the prior 3 years. The Commission found that 36% of customers had switched broadband providers in the past 3 years (compared with 19% of mobile customers switching providers over the same period). Survey
at 6, 10. Of the consumers that had switched ISPs, the overwhelming majority (86%) said the process of switching providers was either "very easy" (56%) or "somewhat easy" (30%). Survey
Instead of describing any unique market failure in the consumer broadband Internet market, what Chairman Wheeler intuitively sensed was the phenomenon of "consumer inertia
." Consumer inertia is a behavioral tendency in markets where products are purchased through contracts--like cable TV
, or insurance
. In these markets, consumers may aggressively shop for their initial service, but then neglect to continue to monitor market prices and, thereby, over time receive less competitive terms.Consumer Inertia Is Good for Competitors, But Not Customers
The effect of customer inertia--on their service providers--is best illustrated by the fact that there are a lot of locations where competitors are serving retail customers with ILEC special access, even though competitive fiber is available. See, e.g.
, T-Mobile example in last blog
. One reason that a CLEC will not automatically use competitive fiber when it becomes available is that each time a retail customer location switches to a different physical transmission line, the CLEC must physically "groom" the retail customer's premise equipment (modems/servers/PBXs) onto the new network. Carriers Hate Physical Grooms
. A physical groom is a hassle for both the CLEC and the customer. To better understand why, let's consider a hypothetical example.
Let's say you're a CLEC, and you're serving a customer with 5 locations in a metro area. Your own fiber is serving 3 of the customer's locations, and the other 2 are served via ILEC special access. To get those 2 special access locations on anyone's fiber
, you (and your customer) have to physically be present to: 1) allow physical access/wiring by the new access vendor, and 2) configure/test the customer's new service. Also, to mitigate the consequences of any service disruption, this usually happens at 3:00 in the morning, preferably on a weekend.
If the worst happens, the business customer could temporarily lose service, lose business, or even end up causing their IT guy to turn into the Michael Douglas character from Falling Down
. The risk varies, but it's always there, and that's without the nastier risk of . . . competition. Customers Love New Fiber Facilities
. Physical grooms are hard on carriers, but customers love how a groom just "wakes them up!" You see, the retail business market works kind of like Chairman Wheeler imagined the mass market for broadband Internet service to work--at least in the sense that business telecom contracts really do have high termination penalties. See, e.g.
small business customer complaints to the BBB about tw Telecom. Early termination penalties--after the original contract term--may even promote
consumer inertia. But, things change when the service provider wants to change the customer's physical service configuration.
In fact, nothing disrupts consumer inertia like the customer spending a lot of time on the phone with their current supplier (as a customer might do to prepare for a coordinated service cutover). In fact, since the CLEC is only coordinating with the customer because it has alternatives
, it's only a matter of time before the customer starts thinking the same thing.
So, referring back to our previous example, let's say you're the CLEC and have been serving this customer for 7 years. And, let's say that the customer has had no disruptions/complaints in that 7 years. You've been sending out bills and they've been sending out checks; it's every carrier's "fairy tale" customer relationship!
Then, you try to do something nice by putting the customer's special access locations onto competitive fiber, and what happens? The customer's eye starts wandering, suddenly nothing in your contract is good enough for them anymore, you become clingy, and, before you know it . . . the "fairy tale" unravels in tears and bitter rancor?!
Well, it's not always that bad. But, at best, if you want to keep the customer, you're probably going to have to lower their price, and stop coming home drunk (or the telecom equivalent). So it's kind of easy to see--from the CLEC's point of view--why, if a customer's service was initiated using ILEC special access, they would need a really good reason
to take the customer off that service.
* * *
Some carriers are lobbying for the blanket extension/expansion of special access regulation, because this service fits comfortably with the network architecture they decided on
15-20 years ago. But, Chairman Wheeler recognizes the limiting effects of inertia on retail consumers, and he knows better than to simply assume that the outcome favored by service providers is also the best outcome for their customers. If the effect of extending special access regulation is to keep retail customers believing that their choices are no different than "the day before they had their service installed" many years ago, do these carriers really believe the FCC will think this is the best choice outcome for consumers?
September 24, 2015 11:10 AM
I was troubled to see the FCC, in its Technology Transitions Order
, tell ILECs that they would not get the full benefit of their new fiber deployments until the Commission concludes its "review" of competition in the "special access market." Order
, paras. 101-143. Then, last Thursday, the FCC announced
that it had taken a "major step" in its review of competition in the special access "market" by making its collected data available to the parties. And, that made me feel a lot better. (just kidding!)
The FCC should
be moving forward with its review, if only because it's been 14 years since AT&T first petitioned the FCC to revisit its 1999 Pricing Flexibility Rules
. However, the fact that the FCC has not, more recently, focused on the threshold question of whether ILEC special access service is even a distinct "relevant market" should give the public doubts about how quickly this matter will conclude.
You see, the FCC can never justify economic regulation for the benefit of "consumers" if the regulation does not apply throughout the entirety of a rationally-defined market. For example, last September, Chairman Wheeler explained in a speech
that he believed cable to be dominant over the most important part of the consumer broadband market (25Mbps and above), yet the FCC's Open Internet rules
applied much more broadly. Likewise, the last time the FCC made rules
affecting ILEC special access, point-to-point data transmission was only widely available from the ILEC.
As a rational matter, unless the Commission's rules cover (at least the majority of) an entire relevant market, its rules cannot possibly provide benefits to consumers in that market. Here's why it's doubtful that "ILEC special access" services constitute a relevant product market in most parts of the country. It's Not a Market If Similarly-Situated Customers Don't Use It
Several years ago, the FCC had a "forum
" on special access, and you know what? Everyone was old! And, so are the companies and carriers that buy a lot of ILEC special access. The next time you see a story about special access, look at the age of the companies complaining. I guarantee you that they all started before 2000.
Why aren't there any "young" companies complaining about special access? Well, probably for the same reason there's no young Bingo players: it's not that fun, and younger gamblers had better alternatives when they picked up the habit.Bandwidth Intensive Customers Don't Need ILEC Special Access
. If this isn't obvious, just look at the blog
where I explained why Google (and other content delivery companies) took Netflix's "interconnection service" candy at the 11th hour of the net neutrality proceeding. Netflix was trying to obtain--through regulatory pan-handling--the same benefits that these companies had invested so much capital to create through their own networks.
The appendix at the end of the blog
shows network investment by companies that were new enough to not need special access, but yet old enough to have purchased high-bandwidth transmission capacity at "rock bottom" prices in the wake of the 2002 telecom meltdown. These companies would never have invested that kind of money to build their own networks if they were destined to be dependent on ILEC special access. Small/Medium Retail Customers Have Non-Special-Access Competitive Alternatives
One might argue that it's unfair to just look at the most bandwidth-intensive customers, because CLECs often rely on special access to serve fairly small (in terms of number of locations) business customers. I couldn't agree more. That's why it was interesting that just last week, Comcast Business Services announced
that they are able to serve multi-location business customers throughout the country through wholesale agreements they have struck with other large regional incumbent cable companies.
While Comcast's announcement focused on the fact that it could now (with out-of-region wholesale agreements) serve large national multi-location customers, the more interesting point was that it's in-region business unit (small/medium customers) has been the fastest growing part of its business for the last several years. Similarly, the success of "bring your own access," web-based business providers, like RingCentral
is further testament to the fact that small and medium business customers generally do have choices for competitive phone service--regardless of whether the customer's existing CLEC provider can use these substitutes as wholesale inputs for their
The bottom line is that it's not a "market" if not everyone needs it--then it's just a brand. But, even old customers of old brands can find it in themselves to switch brands . . . It's Not a Market If There Are Substitutes
You know what's interesting if you compare who filed comments in this proceeding 10 years ago with the companies that are still active now? It's who's missing. Any guesses? Hint: what's different between these two?
No matter what your lyin' eyes are telling you, these are not a "before and after" picture of the same guy. One is T-Mobile Chairman John Legere (before he became a hippie), and the other is John Legere look-alike Christopher Walken.
When the FCC kicked off its special access review, in 2005, T-Mobile filed essentially the same special access comments
as Sprint. But, after the introduction of the iPhone in 2007, it became clear (to everyone not named Sprint) that mobile data was the future of wireless, and bandwidth constrained cell-sites would not satisfy, or attract, customers for long.
Hence, T-Mobile took its first major step in quitting special access in the Fall of 2008, when it named
6 new vendors of advanced fiber backhaul solutions. By February of 2010, it was reported
that T-Mobile had replaced copper backhaul with fiber in 7% of its towers, with plans to raise that number to 25% of its towers by the end of 2010. Finally, in August of 2012, T-Mobile announced
that it had upgraded all of its cell sites to advanced backhaul services, 95% of which were served by fiber.
The T-Mobile example is indeed dramatic. But, just as T-Mobile switched tens of thousands of locations to fiber, there are other successful wireless competitors that entered the market after T-Mobile, like Cricket and Metro PCS (acquired by AT&T and T-Mobile, respectively), that never
used ILEC special access (or at least never complained about it to the FCC).
* * *
Some CLECs have pointed out that there are always going to be some significant number of buildings that will only be accessible via ILEC facilities. But, this fact does not make those locations a "market," because, there is no evidence that the ILECs price services to these locations any differently than they do for the bulk of their customers that do have access to competitive alternatives.
Thus, the FCC cannot rationally conclude that there is a separate "market" for a subset of an ILEC's customers (that the ILEC does not treat differently) for a service that not all of the ILEC's competitors, or retail customers, need to use. And this is why this proceeding will not conclude anytime soon.